In this continuing project we introduce into the economic theory of fertility the possibility that disagreements might arise between spouses regarding the desired level of fertility. We are addressing two specific questions. Under what conditions are the husband and wife most likely to desire a different number of children, and then, when conflict does arise, how is it resolved? We are testing two informal hypotheses in response to the first question. The probability of conflict increases as (1) the non-pecuniary (psychic) rewards of the wife's market work increases, provided that SH greater than SW. These hypotheses are being tested using a limited dependent variable technique using cross section data from the National Fertility Surveys (NFS). These hypotheses will also be tested with the Michigan "Time Use in Economic and Social Accounts 1975-1976" survey, which provides more detailed economic data and better measures of conflict than the NFS. We hypothesize that the resolution, if any, of fertility conflict depends in part on relative economic power. As the disparity in economic power increases, the spouse with the greater resources will predominate. To test this hypothesis we intend to compare, for the households in disagreement in Wave I of the Time Use Survey, the actual increment in fertility for the same households in Wave IV using the Nerlove-Press multinominal logit model. We also intend to generalize Becker's theory of social interaction to capture the possibility of fertility conflict and resolution.